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Is the time dimension really important in research into 
contracting out? 
 
ABSTRACT. In a recent study into the literature, Bel and Fageda (2007) highlighted the 
lack of the time dimension in research dealing with explanatory factors in the decision 
to contract out municipal services. In this paper we attempt to evaluate if the argument 
of Bel and Fageda is true. We do this by means of two methodological contrasts in the 
designing of variables from a dataset containing 744 municipalities in Southern Spain. 
From our empirical analysis, we conclude that the consideration of the time dimension 
does contribute to a better specification of the model, and not considering it could lead 
to a misunderstanding of the motivation behind the decision.  
 
KEYWORDS: Water utilities; contracting out; privatization; public services;  
                     local government  
 
1. Introduction 
In a recent survey Bel and Fageda (2007) question the research that uses cross 
section data in order to analyze the explanatory causes of local government decisions 
regarding the contracting out of municipal services. The cross section data has 
important limitations in terms of explaining those decisions, mainly when dealing with a 
long period of time. The value that the explanatory variables take at the moment x could 
be very different to the value at x-n in which the local government contracted out its 
service. Therefore, explanatory variables of the decision could not capture general 
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conditions at the moment the decision was made, thus contradicting the hypothesis of 
the analysis. 
In their paper, Bel and Fageda point out that this could be the reason for the lack of 
explanatory power in the research that attempts to analyze the decision to contract out. 
This reason could additionally explain why is it so difficult to find cause-effect 
relationships that could be of general application and empirically contrasted. Therefore, 
it is very difficult to infer general patterns of behavior when studying the explanatory 
causes of the decision to contract out of local governments. 
The argument of those authors is certainly plausible. Theoretically, the most 
appropriate method would be to include the value of explaining variables considering 
the moment when the local government decided to change the management of the 
municipal service. Taking this into account, the questions that we pose in this paper are 
the following: Is the consideration of timing in the data relevant for research? What 
repercussions could the lack of inclusion of the time dimension have in the 
interpretation of the results? 
We intend to show this by means of an example about the importance of the manner 
of introducing the data in this kind of analysis. We do so by using data referring to the 
urban water service in 744 municipalities in Andalusia, an autonomous region in 
Southern Spain. The data was gathered for each year over the period 1986-2006. In 
order to capture the effect proposed by Bel and Fageda, the data are introduced in two 
different ways: One is by taking into account the time dimension and the other one is by 
disregarding it. The analysis made is a test, therefore its conclusions are not directly 
extrapolable to different situations. However, it could give some insights into what can 
be expected in other situations as well as providing a reference point for future research.  
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Obtaining significant differences between the two methods would provide an 
additional argument to support the thesis of Bel and Fageda. This would suggest the 
need to treat the conclusions of previous work with caution, even to review those 
conclusions if possible, by introducing the data in the way that Bel and Fageda suggest.  
The results of this work could be of additional interest in research that applies two 
stage techniques of analysis. For instance, Ohlsson (2003) performs a comparative 
analysis of cost efficiency between public and private companies in the urban waste 
disposal service sector. The author incorporates the results obtained in the first stage, 
concluding that private companies do not randomly choose to take responsibility for the 
service privatized by the local administration, but instead they take responsibility for 
this service only in favorable scenarios which allow them to make profits
1
. Other 
examples include Carpentier et al. (2006) and Martínez-Espiñeira et al. (2009), who 
conclude that the price of the water in cities is higher on average when the management 
of the municipal water service is private. This is partly because in a complex 
environment the local government are more willing to delegate the water service. 
This paper provides empirical evidence about the best way of introducing data in 
research that aims to analyze the decision to contract out adopted by local governments. 
This contributes to a better understanding of the actions of the local government. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we examine the 
methodological inconsistency established by Bel and Fageda in the concrete case of 
water services in Southern Spain. Section 3 is devoted to describing the methodology 
and the dataset, respectively. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. The 




2. Methodological consistency in water services in andalusia 
This study focuses on Andalusia, an autonomous region in Southern Spain. The 
surface area of Andalusia occupies around 17 per cent of Spanish territory, and is the 
most populated region in the country, with approximately 8 million inhabitants. Its 
tourist activity is well known outside the region: The good climate, the wide variety of 
hotels and leisure activities are found mainly in the 1,101 kilometers of coastline. 
Monuments such as the Alhambra attract annually around 30 million tourists. 
Spanish legislation establishes that the urban water service is a municipal 
responsibility. However, it is currently not obligatory for the local council to undertake 
its management, as this can be delegated to an external company. Many local 
governments in Andalusia opted for this formula, thanks to the changes established by 
the Law 7/1985, 2
nd
 of April which allowed such privatizations. 
This research is made from data over the period 1986-2006, including 744 
municipalities. This database refers to more than 96 per cent of the total of 
municipalities in Andalusia. Only 29 municipalities could not be included, therefore this 
dataset is almost censal information
2
.  
By 2006 about 40 per cent of the municipalities had contracted out their water 
services. More than 20 years after the establishment of Law 7/1985, we wonder why 
some governments have opted for external contracting out, while others have preferred 
direct management.  
According to Bel and Fageda, research into this subject normally uses cross section 
data. However, this way of introducing the data is not the most accurate in order to 
explain the real situation. In Figure 1 we show how the decision to contract out 
municipal services in Andalusia have been distributed over time. This information 
illustrates the theory of Bel and Fageda.  Taking cross section data for any year in the 
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series could not allow us to capture all of the explanatory factors in contracting out. For 
example, if we took cross section data from the last year of the series, we would be 
considering variables from data from 2006 to explain the contracting out made in 42 
municipalities that took the decision between 1986 and 1990.  
How important is it to take into account this dynamic in the decision-making of 
local governments? In the following sections we explain the methodology, the variables 
and the differences of data timing consideration in order to assess the methodological 
inconsistency proposed by Bel and Fageda. 
 















































3. Methodology and variables 
3.1. The method 
As argued before, the problem in the research of local decisions normally lies in 
cross section data. When the problem consists of describing why the local government 
took the decision to contract out water management, discrete choice models are often 
used (Bel and Miralles, 2003; Dijkgraaf, Gradus, and Melenberg, 2003; Ménard and 
Saussier; 2000; Macauley and Anderson, 2005; Walls, Tavares and Camöes, 2007). 
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Those models are common in this kind of literature, and their complexity depends on 
the number of alternatives. Therefore, if there are only two alternatives, the researchers 
could choose either binary probit or binary logit, and if there are more than two, the 
research will then apply either multinomial probit or multinomial logit
3
. In the 
following lines we briefly present the specification of the binary discrete choice model 
that is applied for estimation. Some more complete information about this model can be 
found in any advanced econometric text, such as Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Greene 
(2008) and Wooldridge (2001). 
The model that we wish to estimate takes the following specification: 
,i iy ε′= +ix β                         (1) 
where 1,....,i N= , 1iy =  o 0iy = , ′ix  is the vector of characteristics of the 
observation i, β  is the vector of parameters that we want to estimate, and iε  is the error 
term. 
Given the dichotomous character of the dependent variable, and depending on the 
nature of the problem described above, model (1) is estimated as a probabilistic model. 
Therefore, assuming that the critical values follow a normal distribution: 
ui ~ N(0,  σ
2 ),  
*
i
y ~  N( ′ix β ,  σ




0y ≥  then 
i




0y <  then 
i
0y = ; 
we could use the probit model expression, defined as: 
 Prob( 1iy = ) = Φ( ′ix β )         (3) 










 =  Φ ( )′ix β ,     (4)  
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where the expression in the inside of the integral corresponds to the normal 
distribution function. If we assume a logistic function, we have the probit model, and its 
expression is: 









       (5) 
Taking into consideration the choice of which distribution to use, we have to take 
into account that both distributions are similar except for the tails. Therefore, for 
intermediate values of 'ix β  the probabilities of both distributions are similar. However, 
the logistic distribution gives greater probabilities for y=0 when the values of 'ix β  are 
small and lower probabilities when the values are high. Both functions are also 
symmetrical. In this work we use the probit model, but both models give similar results. 
In order to estimate the parameters, a likelihood function is maximized. Therefore, 
assuming the specification of formula (1) and after operating, the function to maximize 
can be written as: 
{ }
1




L y F y F
=
= + − −∑ ' 'i ix β x β      (6) 
where F corresponds to the chosen distribution function. Therefore, the partial 
derivatives ln /L β∂ ∂  are calculated, and equaling zero we solve the parameters. If we 
face the problem of choosing between several models, the maximum value of this 
function should indicate the best model to choose. As the aim of this paper is to check 
which is the best model obtained, if we change the design of the explanatory variables, 
this indicator would be extremely helpful in our analysis. 
The goodness of fit of the models can be a useful indicator to determine the best 
model. We can compare the pseudo-R
2
 in the estimation results or calculate the table of 
hits and misses. In this table the values of 0 and 1 of the dependent variable are 
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compared to the values predicted by the model. A high pseudo-R
2
 and a high percentage 
of observations correctly classified indicates a good fit of the model. 
 
3.2 The variables and the hypothesis 
Considering the chosen variables for the estimation, the explanatory variables 
introduced in this analysis are those traditionally used in research. This will allow us to 
estimate our model according to the estimations performed in the literature. The 
variables try to capture the search of greater efficiency, the ideological and political 
motivations, the institutional factors and the financial limitations in the local 
administration (Bel and Fageda, 2007; Boyne, 1998; Domberger and Jensen, 1997; 
Hirsch, 1995a; 1995b; Jensen and Stonecash, 2005).  
To check the importance of timing in the research, we introduce the variables in two 
different ways. In both cases, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if local government has contracted out the water services during 1986 and 2006, 
and 0 in the contrary case. As for the explanatory variables, we introduce the data in a 
cross section format taking, as is usual in the literature, the latest data within the period 
of research. We have called this way Method 1. 
In what we have called Method 2 we follow the recommendation of Bel and 
Fageda, taking into consideration the time dimension. If during the 1986-2006 period 
the local government has opted to contract out, we introduced the data of explanatory 
variables with a delay in time. Therefore we take into account the existing situation at 
the moment in which the local government took the decision. In case the local 
government does not contract out within the period, the explanatory variable takes the 
average value within the period. We take the average value because it captures the 
overall existing situation much better than taking the data of 2006. There are several 
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explanatory variables that undergo no variation: these are urban agglomeration, coast, 
Guadalquivir, Guadiana and South. In Table 1 we show the relation of variables that are 
taken into account in this study and more details regarding the way in which the 
variables have been introduced. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Additionally, these variables have been considered according to several hypotheses, 
motivated by the previous studies cited above and the characteristics of the region 
where data was gathered. A first hypothesis to be contrasted is whether the local 
government is more likely to contract out in search of greater levels of efficiency. In the 
industry considered, the decision is linked to the local scenario. In more complex 
scenarios, it is desirable to have a more professionalized and specialized management 
(Carpentier et al., 2006; Ménard and Saussier, 2000). In order to take into account the 
complexity of the environment, we have introduced two variables related to the 
population and the coast. When the management is carried out by the local council it is 
common for the personnel in charge of the water service to also be responsible for other 
areas at the same time. For instance, when gathering the data we discovered that in a 
small village, the person in charge of the municipal service was also responsible for the 
plumbing when there were leaks in the water distribution network.  It is less surprising, 
but more frequent, for the bureaucrat in charge of management and administration of the 
water service to share this activity with others at the Town Hall. Contracting out could 
lead to specialization in water management. 
In order to obtain greater efficiency, municipalities can join forces with others (Bel, 
Hebdon and Warner, 2007; Warner, 2006; Warner and Hebdon, 2001; Warner and 
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Hefetz, 2003). Therefore, it is possible to obtain the economies of scale that are 
recognized in this sector (Ashton, 2003; Filippini, Hrovatin and Zorić, 2008; Garcia, 
Moreaux and Reynaud, 2007; Kim and Lee, 1998; Torres and Morrison Paul, 2006)
4
. 
This strategy makes particular sense in a country such as Spain that has an important 
rural population spread out in small population nuclei. In order to foster this possibility, 
local governments and administrations have promoted the creation of consortiums. This 
institutional figure can unite the interests of small municipalities that can share the high 
fixed costs in the industry. For instance, it is more efficient to have a common water 
treatment plant that can cover the demands of several small municipalities rather than a 
single plant for each municipality. 
In other cases, a company manages the water service of several cities as a 
consequence of the growth of these cities. In the more dynamic areas, urban 
agglomerations have been created, in which the borderlines between municipalities are 
easily confused. In these cases, a big city with common shared interests is created. 
Sometimes the growth strategy of the original company means that only one company 
ends up managing the water service of the urban area. Another reason for this is that a 
certain municipality observes the success of externalization in a neighboring 
municipality and opts for the same decision.  
Contracting out may be a measure taken by local governments as a reaction to a bad 
financial situation. Privatization can be interpreted as a short term situation to ease the 
pursuit of additional funding to undertake the necessary investment for maintenance and 
renovation of infrastructure (Bakker, 2002; Dijkgraaf, Gradus and Melenberg, 2003; 
Fitch, 2007; Harris et al. 1997; Kodrzycki, 1998; Soler, 2003). It is common for the 
company that wins the tender for water management makes a commitment to trying to 
invest in improving and maintenance of water networks. Therefore, the private sector 
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takes the responsibility for competences that the local government could not maintain 
with its own financial means. 
The political tendency of the local government can influence the decision to 
contract out municipal services. One might expect right-wing parties to be more devoted  
to privatization (Bel and Fageda, 2007). On the other hand, left-wing parties have 
rejected privatization with the aim of guaranteeing jobs and working conditions as well 
as the guarantee of a universal and high quality service. Regarding the dynamics of 
politics, it has been argued that stability in political power can affect the decision to 
contract out. According to Miranda (1994), those mayors who are longest in office tend 
to be more conservative and therefore less willing to undertake this reform. 
These are the variables and the hypotheses used in this research, according to the 
existing literature. These hypotheses will be explored in the next section. More 
importantly, we will address the main hypothesis of this study: To check if the time 
dimension of the data considered plays an important role in the analysis. 
 
4. Results  
In this section we evaluate the importance of considering the time factor in research 
that aims to analyze the decisions adopted by local governments. Descriptive statistics 
of the data are introduced in Table 2. For the quantitative variables we introduce the 
mean, and for the qualitative variables we introduce the percentage of cases that equals 
one. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 3 incorporates the probit analysis
5
. Two estimations are considered, one for 
each procedure for introducing the data. We include the estimated coefficients and the 
standard errors in brackets. According to those results, the best estimation is the one 
performed with type 2 variables. This is due to several reasons. Firstly, the value of the 
log likelihood is greater. Secondly, the pseudo R
2
 is higher, as the independent variables 
account for 64.6 per cent of the probability of contracting out. The explanatory power 
using Method 1 is very limited, only 15.1 per cent. Thirdly, the table of observed and 
predicted observations of the dependent variables also indicates that Method 2 predicts 
much better than Method 1. The percentage of hits, as reported in table 4 is much higher 
using Method 2 than using Method 1 for each class. Therefore, goodness of fit results 
clearly indicates that Method 2 is better than Method 1, as Bel and Fageda suggest.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The differences between Method 2 and Method 1 are quite considerable in terms of 
significance. If we compare the signs of the significant variables between the two 
estimations, they undergo no changes. Therefore, there are no contradictions in the sign 
in which each variable affects the probability of contracting out. The signs of the 
coefficients are consistent with our hypothesis. However, there are differences in 
magnitude and significance that could be misleading for local policy.  
We do not find important differences between both methods for the estimated 
coefficients of the variables that remain constant, independent of the method of 
measuring: urban agglomeration, coast, Guadalquivir and Guadiana. This makes 
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completely sense, and the reverse could induce us to think that there is some influence 
of a certain changing variable on these elements. However, the coefficients that do 
change between both methods are referred to the variables that change within time: 
population, population squared, ideology, power switching and financial burden. These 
results support the importance of considering the time dimension in this analysis. 
Therefore, the time dimension is important, as it affects the interpretation of the 
coefficients. This interpretation is highly relevant because it conditions the actions and 
the decisions of local governments and policy makers. Let us start with those variables 
related to population: Method 1 reports coefficients that are higher in magnitude and 
have a higher significance. Therefore, Method 1 is overestimating the population effect 
and its economies of scale. Concerning variables related to the political tendency of the 
government, the weaker method disregards them as it considers them non-significant. 
On the contrary, Method 2 considers them statistically significant and with a negative 
and positive effect respectively. Finally, using Method 1 the effect of financial burden is 
non-significant, but using Method 2 it is highly significant as expected.  
A researcher who deals with the estimation of a similar model could ask 
himself/herself the following question: Would I be misspecifying my model depending 
on the data I use? In line with the theories defended by Bel and Fageda, the answer 
would be ‘yes’. As Bel and Fageda conclude, the existing literature has shortcomings 
when analyzing the dynamics of local externalization. This has not only created 
difficulties in obtaining systematic results from this literature, but could also create 
misleading results. Our example shows that the differences are not so important in terms 
of the positive or negative signs of the coefficients; but they could be so in terms of 
magnitude and significance. If we had chosen Method 1 for estimation, wrong results 
would be produced for local governments, with the consequent negative impact on 
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policy formulation. Important variables such as the ideology of the local service and the 
financial burden would be disregarded, and others such as population and its economies 
of scale would be overemphasized. 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
In this paper we set out to prove the methodological inconsistency recently 
presented by Bel and Fageda. According to both authors, taking out the time dimension 
is not the best option to analyze contracting-out decisions. This practice could explain 
the low explanatory power of the research on the subject and the diversity of results 
analyzing the causality direction of the relationship of the variables. 
With the aim of contributing to a better understanding and practice in local 
government, this research gives evidence to the thesis put forward by Bel and Fageda, 
orienting future studies which examine decisions related to the contracting out of 
municipal services by local governments. We have achieved this by introducing the data 
in two different ways, one with the time dimension and the other one ignoring this 
dimension. The dataset refers to the water service in 744 municipalities in Southern 
Spain over the period 1986-2006.  
We pose the following question: Is the time dimension really important in research 
into local decisions about contracting out? According to the results, we have to answer 
that question affirmatively. Taking into account the value of the variables in the 
moment in which local governments take the decision gives a better estimation than 
given when ignoring this time dimension. In the two estimations performed the 
significance of the variables that change over time and the magnitude of its coefficients 
are different. However, the significance and the magnitude of coefficients do not vary 
between the two methods for those variables that are constant in time. Therefore, 
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estimating the effect of several variables in the decision to contract out can lead to 
misleading results if we choose to disregard the time dimension. In our example, if we 
ignore the timing of the data, important variables are nonsignificant, such as those 
concerning ideology and the financial burden of the local government. 
In future research we recommend introducing data taking into account the value of 
the variables when the decision was taken. Not doing so means that the description of 
the situation is not complete, and this problem will be greater if we consider a wider 
period of analysis. 
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Table 1.- Variables Description 




1: If at the end of the period the 
council contracts out the water 
management  
0: If the council controls the water 
management. 
1: If at the end of the period the council 
contracts out water management  
0: If the council controls water management. 
Councils and 
private companies.  
Population C 
Population in thousand of 
inhabitants. Value in 2006. 
Population in thousand of inhabitants. 
If the municipality contracts out, it takes the 
value from the previous year. If not, it takes 
the average value of the period. 
Municipal census, 
National Institute of 
Statistics 
Ideology  D 
1: Right-wing ideology of the local 
government. 
0: Left-wing ideology. 
Value in 2006. 
1: If the municipality contracts out and its 
ideology was right-wing. If the municipality 
did not contract out and if the party that was 
most time in power was right-wing. 
0: If the municipality contracts out and its 
ideology was left-wing. If the municipality 
did not contract out and if the party that was 








1: Switch in the ideology of the 
local government in the last two 
electoral periods from 2006. 
0: No switch in the ideology in the 
last two electoral periods from 
2006. 
 
1: If the municipality contracts out and the 
decision is taken by a recently elected 
government. If it did not contract out and if 
there has been a change of government 
during the period considered. 
0: If the municipality contracts out and the 
decision is taken by a government that  has 
stayed in power. If it did not contract out and 
there has been no change of government 
during the period considered. 
Census,  





Debt costs divided by current 
income. We consider the mean in 
the two years before 2006.  
If it contracted out it is the mean within the 
two years before the election. 
In the contrary case, it is the mean within all 
the period.  






1: If the municipality belongs to a 
consortium whose regulations allow 
them to manage to water services. 
0: If the municipality does not 
belong to any consortium. 
Value in 2006. 
In case of contracting out equals 1 if the 
municipality belong to a consortium the year 
before and 0 if not 
In the contrary case, 1 if the municipality 
belong to a consortium in the middle of the 







0: If the municipality does not  
belong to an urban agglomeration 
 1: If the municipality belongs to an 
urban agglomeration  
0: If the municipality does not  belong to an 
urban agglomeration 






1: If the municipality is on the coast. 
0: If it is not on the coast. 
1: If the municipality has a coastline 






1: If the municipality belongs to the 
Guadalquivir Basin  
 0: if not. 
1: If the municipality belongs to the 
Guadalquivir Basin.  






1: If the municipality belongs to the 
Guadiana Basin  
 0: if not. 
1: If the municipality belongs to the 
Guadiana Basin.  
0: If not. 
Hydrographic 
Confederation of 
the River  
Guadiana 
South D 
1: If the municipality belongs to the 
South Basin  
0: if not. 
1: If the municipality belongs to the South 
Basin.  








Table 2.- Descriptive statistics 
Variables Method 1 Method 2 
Contracting-out 40.9% 40.9% 
Population 8.4 7.4 
Population squared 819.7 661.5 
Ideology  19.8% 14.2% 
Power switching 12.6% 45.6% 
Financial burden 1.9 3.7 
Consortium 37.2% 28.8% 
Urban agglomeration 22.2% 22.2% 
Coast 8.1% 8.1% 
Guadalquivir 55.2% 55.2% 
Guadiana 9.0% 9.0% 
South 34.7% 34.7% 
We include the frequency for the qualitative variables  
and the mean for the quantitative ones. 
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Table 3.- Binary probit estimation 

























































Log-likelihood -387.30554 -176.93224 
Pseudo R2 0.1519 0.6456 
Estimated coefficients are presented, and standard errors between brackets.  
South is the omitted variable to avoid perfect multicollineality.  
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels respectively. 
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Table 4.- Classification table of correctly predicted and observed values of the 
dependent variable 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
  Predicted   Predicted  
 0 1 Total  0 1 Total 
0 310 130 440 0 388 52 440 Observed 
1 136 168 304 1 21 283 304 
Total  446 298 744  409 335 744 
Hits   69,5% 56,4%   94,9% 84,5%  
 
Under the label hits, we include the percentage of observed and correctly predicted 0s and 1s over the 
total of the predicted 0s and 1s. 
 
                                               
1
 There is still a debate about the existence of a possible cost reducing strategy as a goal for privatization. 
A discussion of this can be found in Bel and Warner (2008). 
2
 For the gathering of information about the year in which the service was contracted out, if this decision 
was taken, we did the following: First, an e-mail was sent  to all local councils. If no reply was obtained, a 
letter was sent through the traditional post. Finally, if we obtained no results from these methods, a 
telephone call was made. 
3
 There are still more complex techniques in discrete choice models with cross section data, such as 
ordered probit (or logit), mixed probit (or logit) or nested probit (or logit). The description of those lies 
outside the scope of this paper. More information about these techniques can be obtained in Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005). 
4
 A review of research into economies of scale in this industry can be found in González-Gómez and 
García-Rubio (2008). 
 27 
                                                                                                                                          
5  South is taken out from the estimation in order to avoid perfect multicollineality. 
